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1. Introduction 
Investment platforms, also known as ‘fund supermarkets’, are important intermediaries in mutual 
fund investment. These web-based services allow retail investors to research, buy and sell, 
manage, and monitor their holdings in mutual funds. The U.K. mutual fund industry, which is the 
focus of this paper, is one of the largest outside the U.S., with some GBP1.2 trillion of assets 
under management. 1  Investment platforms have been growing rapidly: assets under 
administration (AUA) increased from GBP108 billion in 2008 to GBP592 billion in 2016, and 
platforms now channel over 50% of U.K. mutual fund flows. Investment platforms offer 
investors a wide array of mutual funds to choose from, and like other intermediaries, many 
platforms provide lists of ‘best buys’ or ‘top picks’ for their investors, which we refer to as 
‘recommendations’. Given the growing importance of platforms and the fact that their 
recommendations are made available directly to the general public, they have become 
increasingly a focus of attention in the U.K. This is particularly because, in two ways, platforms 
are exposed to potential conflicts of interest which may lead to favoritism when making 
recommendations. First, some leading platforms are affiliated with mutual funds, that is, they run 
a fund supermarket and offer mutual funds which they manage – their ‘own brands’ – through 
that supermarket. Second, until a regulatory change which was fully implemented in 2016, 
platforms in the U.K. could receive from mutual funds a share of the commission revenue on 
investments which were channeled through the platform. 
 As part of a review of the asset management industry by the U.K. Financial Conduct 
Authority (the ‘FCA’), we have access to detailed, non-public data for three leading direct-to-
consumer platforms over the period 2006–2015 including access to platforms’ recommendations 
of mutual funds.2 Each of these platforms covers on average 45% by number, and 75% by value, 
of all mutual funds available to retail investors in the U.K. Together these three platforms have a 
                                                
1 As estimated by the Investment Company Institute (2017). 
2 The FCA initiated a Wholesale Sector Competition Review in July 2014. It was conducted in two parts, with an 
initial review of Wholesale and Investment Banking, followed by a review of Asset Management (which was 
launched in November 2015). 
 2 
share of over 50% of assets under administration of all U.K. platforms. As well as platforms’ 
recommendations across a wide range of asset classes and investment regions, our data set 
includes precise details of the fees charged by asset managers, the fraction of these fees shared 
with platforms and, for two of the platforms, the investor flows into mutual funds which were 
channeled through the platforms. This allows us to link recommendations with incentives, flows, 
and performance in a way which has not been possible in previous studies of mutual fund 
intermediation.        
 We use this unique data set to address three main questions. First, what drives platform 
recommendations? Second, what effect do these recommendations have on mutual fund flows? 
And, third, do these recommendations add value for investors? In answering all these questions 
we also assess the effect on drivers, flows, and performance of the two potential sources of 
conflicts of interest mentioned above, namely affiliation and revenue-sharing. Our main results 
are as follows. 
 Looking first at the drivers of recommendations, we find that affiliated funds are more 
likely to be recommended by platforms. Controlling for past performance, Morningstar analyst 
ratings, costs, and other variables, affiliated funds are significantly more likely to be added to the 
recommendation list than non-affiliated funds. Average model-implied addition probabilities for 
affiliated funds are three times as large as for otherwise identical non-affiliated funds.  At the 
same time, other things equal, affiliated funds are less likely to be deleted from recommendation 
lists than non-affiliated funds. We estimate that these differences in addition and deletion 
probabilities imply a long term equilibrium percentage of non-affiliated funds in recommendation 
lists equal to 3.6%, compared to 13.8% for otherwise identical affiliated funds. Thus, the long-
term percentage of recommended affiliated funds is 3.8 times larger than the percentage of 
recommended non-affiliated funds. The tendency to recommend affiliated funds seems to have 
increased since regulatory changes were introduced that prohibit commission-sharing with funds. 
We also find that recommended funds share a higher proportion of their revenues with the 
platforms than non-recommended funds. Our estimates indicate that, all else equal, an increase in 
platform revenues received from the fund of 25bps (the interquartile range) would result in an 
increase in the long-term percentage of funds in recommendation lists from 3.87% for funds with 
existing revenue share agreements to 5.18%, for otherwise identical funds with revenue share 
agreements 25bps higher.  
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It is conceivable that platforms favor affiliated and high revenue-sharing funds in their 
recommendations because of some characteristic which is unobservable to the econometrician. 
As a further test for this, we investigate whether funds affiliated with a platform and those 
sharing high levels of revenues with platforms are also favored in recommendations by 
Morningstar Analysts who, like platforms, are making forward-looking recommendations (but do 
not face the same conflicting incentives as platforms), and we find that they are not. 
Apart from affiliation and revenue sharing, we find that, on average, recommended funds 
had exhibited significantly better past performance than the non-recommended funds on the same 
platform. The percentage of funds rated as gold, silver, or bronze by Morningstar analysts, a 
forward looking third-party measure of quality, is also significantly larger among recommended 
than non-recommended funds. Recommended funds tend to have a lower expense ratio, making 
them less costly to investors in fee terms – a non-trivial characteristic in light of the evidence that 
investors have trouble minimizing fees when left to their own devices (see, for instance, Barber, 
Odean and Zheng (2005), Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010), Anagol and Kim (2012), or 
Grinblatt, Ikäheimo, Keloharju, and Knüpfer (2015)). 
 Turning to the impact of recommendations on flows, our analysis shows that platform 
recommendations have a substantial impact on flows. Every year following the addition of a fund 
to a platform’s recommendation list and while still recommended, that fund experiences an 
average inflow of GBP5.9 million, equating to 1% of the total assets under management of the 
fund (and not just those invested through the platform). When we interact recommendations with 
the first of our two possible conflict measures – affiliation – we find that GBP flows are less 
responsive to the recommendation of a fund affiliated with a platform. This may indicate that 
investors discount, to some extent, the own-brand recommendations of platforms. We find no 
significant effect, however, in the case of percentage flows. On the other hand, the response of 
flows to recommendations does not vary significantly with revenue-sharing, a characteristic that 
is not directly observable to investors, suggesting that investors do not offset platforms’ biases 
along this dimension. The different responses of flows to affiliated and high revenue-sharing 
funds likely reflect the fact that fund affiliation is evident to investors whereas, in the U.K., 
revenue-sharing agreements are not disclosed.       
As for our third question, whether recommendations add value for investors, we measure 
the performance of funds recommended by platforms on two bases: first assuming that funds are 
held only for the period during which they are recommended and second, to allow for less 
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responsiveness by investors, assuming that investors hold the recommended funds for five years 
starting from the first recommendation date (or until the end of our sample period). On the first of 
the two approaches, over our 10-year sample period, a portfolio comprising all funds 
recommended by platforms delivered average net returns in excess of Morningstar category 
benchmarks of 0.08% per year. In contrast, non-recommended funds available on the same 
platform under-perform the benchmarks by 0.86% per year. This makes the returns of 
recommended funds a statistically significant 0.94% per annum higher than the excess returns 
obtained by non-recommended funds available via the same platform. When we compare the 
returns of recommended funds to a matched sample of non-recommended funds classified in the 
same Morningstar asset category, which is a closer comparison, the results are similar: 
recommended funds outperform non-recommended funds by a statistically significant 0.60% per 
year. We also find that the level of revenue sharing has little impact on these patterns: 
recommended funds with both high and low revenue-sharing outperform non-recommended 
funds, although not always significantly. When we measure the performance of recommended 
funds on our second measure, which assumes a five-year holding period, we find qualitatively 
similar results. 
However, these performance differences do not hold for the affiliated recommended funds, 
which perform no better than other available funds in the same Morningstar category (and 
available via the same platform). This is consistent with platforms being guided by favoritism, 
rather than private information, when adding own-brand funds to their best-buy lists.  
Our paper is related to a growing literature that investigates the effect of financial 
intermediaries’ incentives on their customers’ portfolios. In this sense, the closest study to ours is 
Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2013), which finds that mutual fund flows reflect the 
incentives (notably revenue sharing) of the brokers that intermediate them. Given our access to 
recommendations issued by the intermediaries (platforms), we build on this finding by 
disentangling intermediary actions from customer actions and by providing more direct evidence 
of the role of platforms and their recommendations in directing flows, as well as of the quality of 
the recommendations provided. This allows us, for instance, to explore explicitly the role of 
platforms in recommending affiliated funds and funds that pay them a higher share of revenues, 
rather than merely establishing which funds are more likely to be available via platforms. It also 
allows us to investigate whether investors see through and undo the biases faced by 
recommending platforms. The focus on favoritism toward affiliated funds is something our paper 
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shares with Pool, Sialm, and Stefanescu (2016) who, in a different context, investigate whether 
mutual fund families acting as trustees of 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own funds. 
Our paper is also closely linked to the work of Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) 
who study broker-sold and direct-sold mutual funds, and fail to find that brokers deliver 
substantial tangible benefits, a conclusion also supported by the work of Chalmers and Reuter 
(2012) and Del Guercio and Reuter (2014). Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) argue that 
this is consistent with two hypotheses: that brokers deliver substantial intangible benefits that 
they do not observe, and that there are material conflicts of interest between brokers and their 
clients. Our study differs from theirs in that, by having access to intermediaries’ 
recommendations, we can make a closer connection between advice and performance, without 
the confounding effect of customer actions. Moreover, since we study the direct-to-customer 
business of investment platforms, we can be comfortable that one of the explanations in 
Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) does not apply to our setting, as there are no obvious 
intangible benefits from having access to recommendations. 
More widely, the paper can be seen in the context of studies that explore the distortive 
incentives faced by agents, brokers, financial advisors and other intermediaries (see, e.g., 
Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar (2012); Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2017), Egan (2017), and the 
theoretical work of Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a, 2012b, and 2012c)). Unlike these papers we 
focus on a situation in which advice (in the form of recommendations) is given to a broad 
audience, rather than a particular customer, and we place strong emphasis on the performance 
associated with that advice.  
Finally, two prior studies have looked at recommendations of managed products or 
mutual funds (not to mention the extensive literature on stock recommendations). Jenkinson, 
Jones, and Martinez (2016) look at recommendations made by investment consultants to 
institutional clients but do not analyze conflicts of interest. Armstrong, Genc, and Verbeek (2016) 
investigate Morningstar analyst ratings. By contrast, we study recommendations issued by 
multiple investment platforms over a significantly longer period of time (using Morningstar 
ratings as controls), and we relate them to the incentives those platforms face.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the institutional 
setting and our unique dataset. Section 3 analyses the determinants of recommendations and their 
effect on fund flows. In section 4 we compare the performance of funds that appear on best-buy 
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lists to those that do not, and how this performance differs for affiliated funds. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Institutional setting and data  
A.  The role of investment platforms  
Investment platforms are web-based services which allow retail investors to research, buy 
and sell, manage, and monitor their holdings in mutual funds.3  They are an important and 
growing distribution channel in many countries. In the U.K., assets under administration held in 
platforms rose from around GBP100 billion at the end of 2008 to almost GBP600 billion at the 
end of 2016 (Platforum (2017) Figure 10). Platforms accounted for 52% of gross sales of funds to 
retail investors in 2015, representing GBP83 billion (Investment Association (2016)); a third of 
these platform sales were direct-to-consumer, and two-thirds were intermediated by an advisor 
(FCA (2016)). In this paper, where we analyze the determinants and impact of platform 
recommendations, we focus on the direct-to-consumer channel. Sales not involving platforms 
may be made directly with an asset manager or through an advisor.4 The leading direct-to-
consumer platform in the U.K. is Hargreaves Lansdown, which has a 36% share of assets under 
administration. The next three largest – Barclays Stockbrokers, TD Direct Investing, and Fidelity 
Personal Investing – have around 10% each. The rest of the market is shared among a large 
number of small players. Of the ten largest U.K. direct-to-consumer platforms by market share, 
seven are vertically integrated, meaning that they have affiliated mutual funds which they offer 
via their platform (FCA (2016)).  
                                                
3  We use ‘investment platform’ synonymously with ‘fund supermarket’. The term ‘investment platform’ is 
sometimes used in the U.K. to include so-called ‘wrap’ platforms, in which assets other than fund shares (e.g. 
directly owned equities) may be held, but we do not include these in our definition. 
4 Data for the U.S. market do not allow a straight comparison. Recent Investment Company Industry research (ICI, 
(2016)) shows that 34% of U.S. mutual fund-owning households bought at least some of their mutual fund shares via 
a category of channels which includes fund supermarkets, discount brokers, and asset management companies 
directly, the other channels being employer-sponsored retirement plans and investment professionals (brokers, etc.). 
A number of U.S. firms which are not primarily platform providers nonetheless offer such a service. For example, 
Charles Schwab, known primarily as a bank and broker, also provides an investment platform comparable with those 
in our data set.    
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Investment platforms offer a wide range of funds, which can be classified and ranked by 
the user according to, among other criteria, asset class, investment style, charges, as well as third-
party rankings, notably those of Morningstar.5 Within its universe of funds, a platform may also 
provide a list of recommended funds which is updated from time to time. Selection criteria 
include past performance, perceived risk, charges, process, tenure of the fund manager, as well as 
third-party rankings. These platform recommendations are the focus of the present paper.6 
The way in which platforms are remunerated for their services must be seen in the context 
of a regulatory change which occurred in the U.K. towards the end of our sample period. From 
2006, when our sample starts, to 2012, investors paid a single all-in annual fee (and in some cases 
an initial charge) to the asset manager, who could share this fee with platforms in return for 
channeling funds to them. The details of such revenue-sharing arrangements were not disclosed 
and even their existence was unknown to many investors.7 There were no separate payments to 
platforms. In particular, there were no ‘sales loads’ as are commonly paid to intermediaries in the 
U.S. The value of revenues paid to platforms by mutual funds as part of the revenue-sharing 
arrangements were typically between 0.5% and 0.75% of the amount invested.8 
Between 2013 and 2016, the U.K. asset management industry implemented a regulatory 
change (the Retail Distribution Review, or RDR) which ended revenue-sharing with platforms 
and required investors to pay the platform and the asset manager separately for their services. For 
platforms, the RDR rules applied to all business (i.e. not just new business) through a ‘sunset 
clause’, which required these distributors to have completed their transition to RDR rules before 
6 April 2016. RDR rules came into force for new business on 6 April 2014. This meant that not 
all direct-to-consumer platforms (the focus of this paper) implemented RDR at the same time, 
and indeed, changes occurred at different points between 2014 and 2016. In order to keep their 
                                                
5 This can be done directly on the platform’s website or on a spreadsheet downloadable from the website. 
6 Investment platforms in the U.K. are not considered to have fiduciary responsibility towards their clients (see Law 
Commission 2014). 
7 The initial charges were typically at levels substantially lower than the maximum level stated in a fund’s prospectus. 
The number of funds levying an initial charge had been declining over time as part of an industry trend towards a 
zero load environment in the U.K., and by 2012 only a small number of funds levied an initial charge. 
8 There was no cap on the fraction of fees that mutual funds could share with platforms comparable to the cap of 1% 
which is imposed on the 12b-1 fees that U.S. mutual funds can charge under FINRA regulations.  
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business under the old and new regimes separate, mutual funds maintained ‘bundled’ share 
classes, on which revenues could be shared with platforms, and launched ‘clean’ share classes, 
which could not take part in revenue sharing. Many platforms implemented RDR rules through a 
staggered approach whereby, during a transitional period, they offered clean share classes for 
new business alongside bundled share classes for existing investors. Each of the three platforms 
we study switched to clean asset classes for new investments during the period February 2014 to 
April 2014. Existing investments were gradually converted into clean share classes by April 2016, 
after which point all investors were either in clean share classes, or were in bundled share classes 
but with shared commission payments being fully passed on to the end investor.  |Therefore, from 
April 2016 all their clients were being charged a separate distribution (platform) fee. When 
revenue sharing was allowed in the U.K., there were two notable differences between 
institutional arrangements in the U.K. and the U.S. First, the amount of the annual (and 
sometimes) initial fees that funds shared with platforms was not disclosed in the U.K., whereas 
U.S. funds must disclose their 12b-1 fees, which represent the annual fees and initial charges 
which fund managers use for marketing and distribution expenses (although the breakdown 
between revenue sharing and other distribution/marketing costs is not disclosed). Second, there 
were no sales loads paid directly to U.K. platforms, in contrast to the U.S. mutual fund industry, 
where front-end loads in particular are an important part of the compensation of intermediaries. 
Following the implementation of RDR, the situation in the U.K. is simple for platforms: 
investors pay one fee to the platform (the platform charge) and a separate fee to the fund manager 
(the asset manager fee), and there is no sharing of either annual or initial charges. 
B.  The dataset  
The FCA obtained data from the four largest investment platforms. One of these 
platforms was excluded from the analysis, as critical data required for our analysis (such as 
revenue share data and investment flow data) were not available. The analysis in this paper is 
therefore based on the remaining three large, well-established platforms. These platforms have a 
combined share in excess of 50% of the U.K. market for direct-to-consumer assets under 
administration. None of the smaller platforms, from which data was not obtained, has a market 
share in excess of 5%. Furthermore, most of them do not produce their own recommendations. 
Data was provided on a monthly basis by each platform for the period 2006-2015, or the period 
during which a recommendation list was available to clients.  
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Each of the platforms in our study makes available to their clients at least one internally 
produced recommendation list. 9  When a platform has more than one internally prepared 
recommendation list we aggregate them into a single list per platform. This data allows us to 
identify, for each platform, when a mutual fund appeared in a recommendation list, the period 
during which it remained on the list, and (if applicable) the date when the mutual fund was 
removed from the list. This information is typically not publicly available, as platforms are not 
required to disclose their historical fund recommendations. 
The information requested by the FCA also provided us with information for the same 
three platforms on their annual core platform charges over time, expressed as a proportion of 
assets under administration. For each mutual fund share class available on the platforms in our 
sample we also have historical information on the revenue shared by the fund with platforms in 
the form of commission, as well as the revenue passed on to a platform’s clients in the form of a 
rebate. The revenue passed on by the fund to the platform and any rebate to platform clients are 
expressed as a proportion of assets under management. We also have information at a share class 
level on fund initial charges, expressed as a proportion of initial investment. 
Before RDR, the principal source of revenue for investment platforms was a share of 
annual fees passed onto them by fund managers. Following RDR, the main source of revenue for 
platforms is a separate platform charge levied directly from investors. Before RDR, the share of 
fees paid by funds to platforms used to vary by mutual fund and share class; since RDR, platform 
charges are the same for all mutual funds offered on a platform, but vary from platform to 
platform. Platform charges in some cases vary according to an investor’s portfolio size, with 
larger portfolios being rewarded with lower platform charges.  
We carry out our analysis at the fund-platform level. This is because all fund commentary 
and other communications regarding the lists discuss the funds at a fund level and not in relation 
to individual share classes. Because of RDR, funds tend to have clean and bundled retail share 
classes (at least during part of our sample period, as discussed earlier). If a fund has multiple 
retail share classes within each of these two categories, we group them into a single clean or 
bundled group (or ‘fund’ as we call it) by averaging performance, fees and other charges. We 
                                                
9 Some platforms also make available to their clients recommendation lists produced by third parties not connected to 
the platform (these external recommendation lists may also be available elsewhere, such as on third party websites). 
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analyze only the bundled group during the bundled period and clean group during the clean 
period.10 The bundled and clean share periods are platform-specific and depend on when the 
platform implemented RDR.11  
 These variables are combined with publicly available monthly data for 2006-2015 on 
returns, assets under management, and other variables of interest from Morningstar Direct, a 
third-party source for fund and share class information. Charges data is also sourced from 
Morningstar Direct, and is available only annually. The charges data is augmented with charges 
data obtained by the FCA from a sub-sample of asset managers.  
 Our sample comprises equity, fixed income, asset allocation, and alternative investment 
open-ended retail mutual funds available for sale in the U.K., with GBP-denominated share 
classes. We exclude mutual funds in the following Morningstar broad category groups: 
commodities, property, money market, convertible and miscellaneous, because none (or almost 
none) of the funds in these categories ever appeared in the platform recommendation lists in our 
sample. The excluded categories only represent a small percentage of the funds offered by these 
platforms. Our dataset contains both currently operating and closed/merged funds. 
For our analysis it is important to determine which funds are offered on each platform, as 
these funds form the pool from which a platform’s recommendation lists are drawn. We use two 
criteria to infer availability in a platform: the existence of revenue share agreements (we only 
have this information on an end-of-year basis); and within-platform fund flows (this information 
was obtained by the FCA for two platforms and is available on a monthly basis but only when 
funds experience flows). We consider a fund as being available on a platform in any given month 
if there is a revenue share agreement in place and/or if, within three months of the month in 
question, there are flows within the platform. We find that both indicators coincide in almost all 
cases. 
                                                
10 An exception to this rule is some mutual funds that were only available in clean share format before RDR. Those 
mutual funds are included in the pre-RDR analysis. 
11 In our analysis the only use we make of share class information is to construct aggregate, fund-level, observations. 
For each platform we use only the share classes distributed through that platform rather than all available fund share 
classes. This means that a mutual fund may have a different cost, revenue share agreement, and performance (past 
and future) when acquired through different platforms. 
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Of the funds listed on the platforms in our sample, some are affiliated to the platform and 
others are not affiliated. We use two different Morningstar Direct data fields (‘branding name’ 
and ‘advisor’) to track affiliation from a fund to the platform. Branding name reflects the fund 
distributor, and advisor is the fund management company. A fund is considered affiliated to a 
platform if it shares branding name or advisor with the Platform. 
Platforms typically carry a large number of mutual funds. As Table I shows, on average 
each platform in our sample includes 1,595 different mutual funds. This represents 45.2% of the 
funds available in the U.K. each year during our sample period (in the four large categories we 
study). The assets under management of these funds are 74.9% of all assets under management 
by U.K. mutual funds, suggesting that most of the larger funds are available via the platforms.12 
During our sample period, on average of 7.2% of the funds available in the platforms appeared on 
internally prepared recommendation lists, a percentage that has shown a tendency to decrease 
over time. 
As shown in Table II, funds offered on the platforms in our sample tend to be larger, older, 
and exhibit better past performance (prior one- and three-year performance and percentage of 
Morningstar 5 Star rated funds) and expected future performance (percentage of Morningstar 
gold and gold, silver or bronze rated funds) than those not available on the platforms.13  
For the purposes of this table, performance percentiles are calculated over the previous 
one and three years based on funds in the same Morningstar category and assuming no platform 
rebates, and average platform charges after RDR. Returns and fees and charges are also not 
platform-specific, and include an average platform service charge fee for clean share classes post-
RDR. We also ignore initial charges, if any. This is in contrast to the rest of our analysis, where 
we concentrate on within platform comparisons. There, in calculating charges and the returns to 
                                                
12 The figures we report are averages across platforms of yearly averages of monthly data for each platform. The 
sample mean is an average of these averages. Pre-RDR and Post-RDR calculations take into account the different 
implementation points of RDR in the different platforms. 
13 From a technical point of view what we report here are simple averages using all monthly observations for each 
fund, and we compute p-values taking into account intra-fund correlations by using standard errors clustered at the 
fund level. We have three platforms, so each fund enters in our sample up to three times in a single time period. It 
may enter as an in-platform fund for one of the platforms and not in platform for the other two. 
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investors we take into account all charges and rebates offered by platforms. We do this by 
assuming investors hold a portfolio of GBP50,000 on a platform in order to calculate platform 
charges, which typically vary by portfolio size. When there are initial charges we also take their 
impact on costs and returns into account by assuming a five-year holding period.  
The Morningstar Analyst rating reported in Table II is a qualitative, forward-looking 
measure of performance that reflects an analyst’s expectation of a fund’s future performance 
relative to its peers over a business cycle (see Armstrong, Genc, and Verbeek (2016) for more 
information). The current Morningstar Analyst rating scale was introduced in November 2011 
and consists of gold, silver, bronze, neutral and negative ratings. Before this, two different 
systems were used: elite, superior, standard, inferior, impaired, and an AAA, AA, A system 
inherited from the acquired business Old Broad Street Research. These were mapped together as 
follows (thus extending our sample back until 2006): elite and AAA historical ratings mapped 
directly to the gold ratings cohort, and we labeled them together as “gold”. We also create a 
broader category capturing any level of positive recommendation, which we refer to as “gold, 
silver or bronze” (and so, in addition to our “gold” category, this includes funds rated as superior, 
AA, A, silver or bronze). 
Table III contains further information about the sample of mutual funds offered and 
recommended by each platform. It shows that equity funds are the largest category both in terms 
of funds offered (an average of 1,015 funds per year, or 64% of the available funds) and in terms 
of recommendations (an average of 82 fund recommended per platform per year, or 74% of the 
recommendations made), followed by fixed income and asset allocation. Alternative investment 
mutual funds represent only a small fraction of their offering sample.   
3. What determines recommendations and do they affect fund flows? 
A. What determines recommendations? 
In this section, we explore what determines the listing of a mutual fund in a platform 
recommendation list. Table IV describes the characteristics of mutual funds which are 
recommended and those which are not recommended. Our sample contains 330,175 platform-
fund-month observations, of which 231,524 are observations from before the implementation of 
RDR and 98,651 are from after RDR implementation. In the full sample 20,461 platform-fund-
month observations correspond to recommended funds and 309,714 to non-recommended funds. 
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P-values for the differences between the mean characteristics of recommended and non-
recommended funds are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. 
Overall, recommended funds exhibit significantly better past performance. We compute 
fund performance percentile rankings using past one- and three-year platform-specific returns in 
excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks, and we also calculate the percentage of 5-starred 
Morningstar funds in each group.14 On the former measure, the average one-year (three-year) past 
performance ranking of recommended funds is 55.8% (63.4%), whereas the non-recommended 
funds average 49.0% (48.5%).  
The percentage of funds rated as gold, silver, or bronze by the Morningstar Analyst 
rating, a forward-looking measure of quality, is also significantly larger among recommended 
funds. 18.0% of recommended funds have the gold rating, compared with only 1.4% of non-
recommended funds. Indeed, over 60% (14%) of recommended (non-recommended) funds are 
rated as gold, silver or bronze, which suggests that platforms are either heavily influenced by 
Morningstar Analyst ratings when constructing their best-buy lists, or at least that they use 
similar information and criteria. Recommended funds also tend to be less costly to investors, they 
are significantly larger in terms of assets under management, possibly in part because of the 
recommendations, and exhibit higher standard deviations of monthly returns. 
Table IV also shows that a significantly higher percentage of affiliated than non-affiliated 
funds is recommended in these internal lists. Recommended funds also tend to contribute 
significantly higher revenues to the platforms listing them, per each pound individuals invest in 
through the platforms, than non-recommended funds.15 
These characteristics of recommended and non-recommended funds, being univariate and 
observation weighted, do not necessarily imply any bias in favor of affiliated funds or funds that 
make larger contributions to platforms. Affiliated funds and funds that make larger revenue 
                                                
14 Returns used in the computation of performance ranks are adjusted to reflect all relevant charges and rebates 
levied by each platform in which the fund is offered. These charges and rebates are computed assuming a total 
combined investment in mutual funds of GBP 50,000 through the platform. The same applies to fund expenses and 
charges.  
15 After RDR, funds stopped making payments to platforms and platforms started to charge their customers a flat fee, 
or a fee that depends on the assets individuals invest through the platforms, but not on the funds they invest in. 
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contributions to platforms may very well be better funds. After all, recommended funds in 
general exhibit better past performance, expected future performance, and are on average also 
cheaper than non-recommended funds, and the same may be true of the subgroup of affiliated and 
high-contributing funds that are recommended. Even if that were not true, funds in these two 
categories might also exhibit other characteristics that the analysts preparing recommendations 
list also favor, like significant size or a long track-record.  
To test whether mutual funds affiliated with the platforms and those which share more 
revenues with the platform (as a percentage of assets accumulated through the platform) are 
treated preferentially relative to non-affiliated funds or funds which share less of their revenues 
with the platform we study alterations which platforms make to their recommendation lists.16 
Platforms adjust their recommendation lists from time to time by deleting some mutual funds and 
adding others. We use the following logit models separately to model fund addition and deletion 
probabilities: 
 𝑃(𝐴𝐶𝑇&,(,) = 1) = 𝛬 𝐴𝐹𝐹&,(,)/0123 𝛽155123 + 𝑅𝑆&,(,)/0123 𝛽9:123 + 𝒁&,(,)/0123 𝜷=123 ,	  (1) 
 
where the function 𝛬 𝑧 	 is defined as 𝛬 𝑧 = exp 𝑧 /(1 + exp 𝑧 ),  ACTp,f,t = ADDp,f,t 
(Addition) or DELp,f,t (Deletion) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if mutual fund f 
is added to, or deleted from, (depending on the specification) the recommendation list in platform 
p during month t and 0 otherwise, 𝐴𝐹𝐹&,(,)/0123  is an indicator for whether the fund f is affiliated 
with platform p at the end of month t−1, 𝑅𝑆&,(,)/0123  is the revenue obtained by the platform p from 
each pound individuals invest in fund f through the platform at time t−1, and 𝒁&,(,)/0123  is a vector 
of lagged control variables including the pro-rated total cost of the fund assuming a five-year 
investment or holding period (fund’s total expense ratio, plus one fifth of the initial fund charge, 
                                                
16 List membership depends on these decisions, as well as the initial listing decisions made when a recommendation 
list is first launched. In our analysis we exclude initial listing decisions since we do not always observe them in our 
sample (some of them were made before the start of our sample period). It is important to notice, however, that as 
time passes the importance or influence of initial listings becomes less relevant for current list composition. 
Including initial listing as additions, for the platforms we have that information, does not significantly alter the 
results reported below. 
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plus associated platform charges minus any fund rebates), performance percentiles computed 
using platform-specific fund returns in excess of Morningstar-chosen category benchmarks over 
the previous one and three years (platform-specific returns take into account charges and rebates 
applied by platforms assuming a five-year investment or holding period), the turnover of the 
fund, the natural logarithm of the fund’s size (in millions of GB pounds), fund age, the standard 
deviation of the fund’s return, an indicator variable for whether Morningstar has assigned a five-
star rating to the fund, indicator variables for whether Morningstar analysts have assigned a gold, 
or gold, silver, or bronze rating to the fund, and unreported indicator variables for calendar years 
and for specific fund types (e.g., equity, fixed income, asset allocation, and alternative 
investments). 
We estimate different logit regressions for additions to the recommendation lists and 
deletions from these lists. We also estimate different logit regressions for the full sample (of 
additions or deletions) as well as for subsamples covering the periods before and after the 
implementation of RDR by each platform. In all cases we report coefficient estimates and z-
scores based on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level. 
If there were favoritism toward affiliated funds then, all else equal, the percentage of 
affiliated funds recommended would be larger than the percentage of non-affiliated funds 
recommended. In the long run (steady state equilibrium) these percentages depend exclusively on 
the conditional probabilities of adding an affiliated fund to the recommendation list	 𝑃1551DD , 
removing an affiliated fund from that list 𝑃155DEF , adding a non-affiliated fund to the 
recommendation list 𝑃G1551DD , and removing a non-affiliated fund from that list 𝑃G155DEF . 
Favoritism toward affiliated funds implies that 𝑃1551DD 𝑃1551DD + 𝑃155DEF  > 𝑃G1551DD 𝑃G1551DD + 𝑃G155DEF . A sufficient (although not necessary) condition for this inequality to be 
satisfied is that 𝑃1551DD ≥ 𝑃G1551DD  and 𝑃155DEF ≤ 𝑃G155DEF , with at least one of these two inequalities 
satisfied in a strict sense. That is, all else equal, affiliated funds have to be more, or at least as, 
likely to be added to recommendations lists (𝛽1551DD ≥ 0, using Equation (1) notation) and less, or 
at most as, likely to be delisted (𝛽155DEF ≤ 0), with at least one of these two inequalities satisfied in 
a strict sense. Similarly, a sufficient condition for favoritism towards funds paying higher 
revenues to the platform is that, all else equal, funds contributing higher revenues be more, or at 
least as, likely to be added to recommendations lists (𝛽9:1DD ≥ 0), and less, or at most as, likely to 
be delisted (𝛽9:1DD ≤ 0), with at least one of these two conditions satisfied in strict sense. 
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Table V reports logit coefficient estimates for the various specifications. We find that 
addition probabilities differ significantly between affiliated and non-affiliated funds. For the full 
sample, the coefficient estimates on our Affiliated dummy in the additions model is significantly 
positive at the 1% level. This indicates that, at identical levels of past performance, external 
assessments of future performance, costs and other controlled for variables, affiliated funds are 
significantly more likely to be added to the recommendation list than non-affiliated funds. The 
sub-period analysis indicates that this effect is stronger in the post-RDR period. Before RDR 
there was a modest, but statistically insignificant, preference for own-brand funds. Since RDR, 
the probability of being recommended is significantly higher for funds that are affiliated with the 
platform. These results are mirrored in the deletion models, where the coefficient estimates on 
our Affiliated dummy variable becomes negative and significant at the 1% level in the post-RDR 
period. This suggest that, other things equal, affiliated funds are at least equally likely, and in 
some situations, more likely to be deleted from recommendation lists than non-affiliated funds.  
To interpret the coefficient estimates we compute average marginal effects. The second 
part of Table V displays model-implied average marginal effects for the two main variables of 
interest: Affiliation and Platform Revenue from the Fund. Using data for the entire sample period, 
the results show that, all else equal, the predicted probability of being added to a recommendation 
list in any given month is 0.0017 greater for affiliated funds than for non-affiliated funds. As a 
result, average model-implied monthly addition probabilities for affiliated funds (𝑃1551DD = 0.0027) 
are three times as large as for otherwise identical non-affiliated funds (𝑃G1551DD =	0.0009).17 At the 
same time, deletion probabilities are smaller for affiliated funds than for non-affiliated funds, 
with differences in deletion probabilities equal to -0.0085 per month for the full sample and a 
statistically significant -0.0290 per month for the post-RDR sample. To understand the impact of 
these differences in addition and deletion probabilities it is useful to think on their implications 
for the long-term percentage of affiliated and non-affiliated funds being recommended. Using 
average model implied estimates of addition and deletion probabilities the long term, equilibrium, 
                                                
17 Average model implied addition probabilities for affiliated funds, 𝑃1551DD, are computed as the average across our 
sample of 𝛬 𝛽1551DD + 𝑅𝑆&,(,)/01DD 𝛽9:1DD + 𝒁&,(,)/01DD 𝜷=1DD , whereas average model implied addition probabilities for non-
affiliated funds, 𝑃G1551DD , are computed as the average across our sample of 𝛬 𝑅𝑆&,(,)/01DD 𝛽9:1DD + 𝒁&,(,)/01DD 𝜷=1DD . We 
follow a similar procedure for the computation of affiliated and non-affiliated fund deletion probabilities. 
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percentage of non-affiliated funds in recommendation lists, 𝑃G1551DD 𝑃G1551DD + 𝑃G155DEF 	= 0.0009 / 
(0.0009 + 0.0252), is 3.63%, compared to 13.81% (𝑃1551DD 𝑃1551DD + 𝑃155DEF  = 0.0027 / (0.0027 + 
0.0167)), for otherwise identical affiliated funds. That is, these addition and deletion probabilities 
imply a percentage of affiliated funds being recommended in the long run that is 3.8 times larger 
than the percentage of non-affiliated funds receiving a recommendation. 
Addition probabilities are also significantly larger for mutual funds paying a larger share 
of the assets they obtain through the platform back to the platforms. For example, our 
calculations indicate that, all else equal, an increase of 100 bps in Platform Revenue from the 
Fund increases the probability of the fund being added to the recommendation list by 0.0016 in 
any given month, with no discernible effect in deletion probabilities.18 As an illustration, this 
implies that an increase in Platform Revenue from the Fund  equal to 25bps (the interquartile 
range) will result in average addition probabilities that are 40% larger than the average model 
implied addition probabilities for the observations in our sample (the average monthly, model 
implied, addition probability is 0.0010). In turn this leads to an increase in the long term 
percentage of funds in recommendation lists from 3.87%, for funds with actual revenue share 
agreements (𝑃1M1DD 𝑃1M1DD + 𝑃1MDEF  = 0.0010 / (0.0010 + 0.0249)), to 5.18% for otherwise 
identical funds with 25bps higher revenue share agreements (𝑃1MNO.PQ1DD 𝑃1MNO.PQ1DD + 𝑃1MNO.PQDEF  = 
0.0014 / (0.0014 + 0.0257)).19  That is, these addition and deletion probabilities imply a long run 
percentage of recommended funds that is 34% larger than the percentage implied by actual 
revenue share agreements other things equal. The effect is larger, 56%, if we focus on estimates 
obtained using data from the pre-RDR period only. 
                                                
18 The revenue channel was shut down following RDR implementation, thus we do not compute marginal effects or 
estimate coefficients for the post RDR sample (what the revenue platforms obtain from selling a fund is equal across 
funds). 
19 Average model implied addition probabilities at current revenue share levels, 𝑃1M1DD, are computed as the average 
across our sample of 𝛬 𝐴𝐹𝐹&,(,)/01DD 𝛽1551DD + 𝑅𝑆&,(,)/01DD 𝛽9:1DD + 𝒁&,(,)/01DD 𝜷=1DD , whereas average model implied addition 
probabilities for non-affiliated funds, 𝑃1MNPQ1DD , are computed as the average across our sample of 𝛬 𝐴𝐹𝐹&,(,)/01DD 𝛽1551DD +(𝑅𝑆&,(,)/0123 +0.25)𝛽9:123 + 𝒁&,(,)/0123 𝜷=123 . We follow a similar procedure for the computation of affiliated and non-
affiliated funds deletion probabilities. 
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The additional control variables indicate that funds that are costlier to investors (higher 
Total Fees and Charges Ratio) are, other things equal, less likely to be added to recommendation 
lists, and as likely to be deleted once there. Thus, while platforms issuing these recommendations 
may favor funds that make higher payments to platforms, they do not certainly favor funds that 
are more expensive to their customers. Additionally, funds with better prior performance or 
expected future performance are marginally more likely to be added to the recommendation list 
and/or less likely to be deleted from these lists. In our analysis we use three different measures of 
fund prior performance and two measures of independent analysts’ sentiment about the funds 
future performance, all of which are correlated with each other, thus making it difficult to 
interpret their individual coefficients (our main interest is in controlling for these factors rather 
than assessing their contribution to the appearance of a fund on an individual list). Our results 
suggest that Morningstar five-star funds are more likely to be added to recommendation lists and 
are equally likely to be deleted from them once there (when simultaneously controlling for the 
funds past one and three year return in excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks), whereas funds 
with recent one and three year good past performance are less likely to be deleted from these 
lists. At the same time, funds rated gold, silver, or bronze by Morningstar analysts, a measure of 
expected future performance and independent analysts’ sentiment for the fund, are marginally 
more likely to be added to and less likely to be deleted from these lists.  
Morningstar analyst ratings are produced by a team of analysts following processes (see 
Armstrong, Genc, and Verbeek, 2016) that are similar to those used by the analysts that prepare 
platforms internal lists, without being subject to the conflicts of interest that potentially affect the 
latter.20 Their significance in the previous set of regressions suggests that both groups of analysts, 
those behind platform recommendations and Morningstar’s, share some common sentiment or 
perceive certain intangibles about funds in a similar way. It is even possible that the two groups 
imitate each other or that one of them follows the other. 
Morningstar analysts are likely drawn to some of the same features of mutual funds 
which, while unobservable to the econometrician, also attract platform analysts. However, they 
have no reason to be influenced by the revenue share or affiliation incentives that potentially 
                                                
20 Morningstar analyst ratings started under the Morningstar brand in the U.K. in 2011, but a similar rating schedule 
existed before through a company called OBSR, which was acquired by Morningstar in 2011. 
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distort platforms’ internal recommendation lists. We take advantage of this feature of 
Morningstar ratings in a second placebo-like test designed to further assess the robustness of our 
findings. In this test we explore Morningstar analysts’ decisions to add funds to, and delete funds 
from, their gold, silver, or bronze lists, using the same modeling strategy and explanatory 
variables we used to analyze platform listing and delisting decisions. We estimate a logit model 
identical to that described in Equation (1) using the same set of platform-fund-month 
observations but modelling additions and deletions to the Morningstar list rather than to the 
platforms internal lists. These regressions include the same Affiliation and Platform Revenue 
from the Fund variables used when modeling platforms listing and delisting decisions but 
excluding Morningstar analyst ratings. 
If there is nothing special about affiliated funds and funds rebating larger shares of assets 
under management to platforms (before RDR) we would expect these two variables to be not 
statistically significant in the regressions. On the other hand, if those funds have unobservable 
qualities that attract analysts (for reasons other than the incentives they offer platforms) we would 
expect these variables to be statistically significant. This is another way of controlling for the fact 
that affiliated mutual funds and mutual funds that contribute larger revenues to platforms may be 
attractive to analysts for reasons that are difficult to quantify using traditional variables. It is also 
potentially more flexible, given the differences in baseline addition and deletion probabilities 
between platforms and analyst ratings. 
We report the results of this estimation in Table VI. Results in this table show that neither 
an affiliation between fund and the platform where it is offered, nor revenue rebate have any 
significant impact on Morningstar analysts’ addition and deletion decisions to gold, silver, or 
bronze lists, during the full sample or during any of the sample periods we study. We therefore 
conclude that Morningstar analysts do not see anything special in these funds. We cannot do a 
similar estimation for gold only lists because no affiliated fund was added to Morningstar 
analysts’ gold list during our sample period. As a result, the coefficient on affiliated cannot be 
determined, if anything providing further support to the idea that affiliated funds are not special. 
Overall, our results for both deletion and addition decisions provide evidence that 
affiliated funds are treated differently than non-affiliated funds. Affiliated funds are more likely 
to be added to and, after RDR, are less likely to be deleted from, recommendation lists. We find 
similar results for funds that share more of the commission revenues with platforms before RDR 
implementation. Together with the results that suggest that Morningstar analysts are not swayed 
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by these funds, they provide evidence that platform recommendation lists favor affiliated mutual 
funds and funds with high revenue share to an extent that is difficult to justify by the qualities of 
those funds.  
B. What effect do recommendations have on flows?  
To explore how asset flows respond to recommendations we expand a typical flow-
performance regression (see, for instance, Ippolito (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1998)) to include, 
as regressors, variables for past recommendations and recommendation additions and deletions. 
We consider two flow measures: first, the platform-specific GBP flow into and out of a mutual 
fund, a variable obtained from the platforms themselves; and, second, the percentage flow 
computed as the ratio of platform-specific GBP flows to the total net assets invested in the mutual 
fund (whether through the platform or not) as of the end of the previous year. 
We are interested in measuring how flows respond to recommendations and 
recommendation changes (that is, additions to and deletions from recommendation lists), 
controlling for publicly available measures of past performance, as well as for other product 
attributes known to affect flows which could also affect recommendations. We therefore estimate 
the response of platform-specific flows to recommendation changes using the following 
regression on yearly data: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤&,(,) = 𝑹𝑬𝑪&,(,)/0𝜷9E2 + 𝒁&,(,)/0𝜷= + 𝜖&,(,),         (2) 
where Flowp,f,t is either the platform-specific GBP flow or the percentage flow, 𝑹𝑬𝑪&,(,)/0 is a 
vector that captures whether fund f appears in the recommendation list of platform p at time t-1  
as well as the addition and deletion of fund f to this recommendation list over the previous three 
years (in three different specifications), and 𝒁&,(,)/0  is the same vector of lagged control 
variables that we used in the previous section, except that we also include a full set of fund-
specific and platform-specific indicator variables, and in the GBP flows regressions we use, as 
regessors, the total net assets of product i on date t-1  (fund size), rather than the log assets (see 
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)). To reduce the effect of outliers on the coefficient estimates, we 
remove all funds with total net assets at time t-1 below GBP 10 million from the sample (see, e.g., 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997)). 
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Table VII reports results of estimating this regression using pooled time-series cross-
sectional data with GBP flows and percentage flows as the dependent variables. The coefficients 
on the variables capturing the effect of lagged recommendation levels on absolute flows are 
positive and statistically significant. This suggests that individual investors respond to funds 
appearing in the recommendation list of a given platform by increasing their investment in the 
recommended fund through that platform. The estimate in column (1) indicates that 
recommended funds experience, on average, an increase in net flows of GBP 5.9 million per year 
in every year following their appearance in the list. Qualitatively similar results obtain if we use 
percentage flows as the dependent variable. The estimates in column (4) suggest that a mutual 
fund appearing in the recommendation list in the previous year receives, on average, extra net 
inflows equal to 1% of the overall assets managed by that mutual fund (and not just those 
invested through the platform) in the previous year, owing to that recommendation.21 In all cases 
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level, which are White 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors corrected for possible correlation across observations 
of a given mutual fund (White (1980), Rogers (1993)). 
The difference between, on the one hand, columns (1) and (4) and, on the other, columns 
(2), (3), (5), and (6) is that the latter also include, as regressors, indicator variables for lagged 
additions to and deletions from the recommendation lists while (1) and (4) do not. The reason for 
including lagged additions to and deletions from the recommendation lists, in addition to 
recommendation levels, is that the effect of a recommendation could be concentrated in the first 
year, or first few years, following a recommendation (additions) and investors attracted by 
recommendations may in fact abandon them when they cease to be recommended (deletions). 
The estimates in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) indicate that while the positive effect of 
recommendations on flows is spread more or less evenly during the years the fund is 
recommended (each year adding a similar amount of money to the funds’ total net assets the 
                                                
21 Because we divide flows through a single platform by total assets under management all coefficients in the 
percentage flows column look relatively small. To put the 1% figure in perspective, consider that the average 
platform in our sample has a 15%-20% market share (of the direct to consumer platform market), which means that 
if all the platforms were to recommend a mutual fund that would result in a 5% to 7.5% asset flow (and platforms 
account for less than 50% of the AUMs in the UK). 
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following year), deletions lead to significant outflows in the first three years following deletion 
(compared to a situation where the fund was never recommended); this is possibly the result of 
investors attracted by those recommendations moving their money elsewhere once the fund is 
removed from the recommendation list.  
Our regressions also indicate that previous (one year) performance and Morningstar five 
star ratings have a significant direct impact on asset flows, in addition to their indirect impact via 
recommendations, a result which is in line with the previous literature on the topic  (see, for 
instance, Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) for the 
impact of past performance, and Bergstresser and Poterba (2002), Del Guercio and Tkac (2008), 
and Ivković and Weisbenner (2009) for the influence of Morningstar star ratings). However, 
appearing on a platform recommendation list has a significantly bigger direct effect on net flows 
through the platform than receiving a five-star rating by Morningstar, or being included in 
Morningstar analysts’ gold, silver, or bronze categories rating.22 
Investors could offset the favoritism which platforms show towards affiliated funds in the 
recommendation lists, by discounting the platforms’ recommendations of these funds. Investors 
could also potentially offset any favoritism shown by platforms towards funds with high revenue 
share agreements by, for instance, not allocating capital to poorly performing funds with high 
revenue share agreements (even though the revenue sharing arrangements between platform and 
fund are unlikely to be in investors’ information set). We next investigate whether they do that by 
estimating the response of platform-specific flows to recommendation changes interacted with 
variables for affiliation and revenue sharing. The regressions we estimate are the following: 
 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤&,(,) = 𝑅𝐸𝐶&,(,)/0𝛽9E2 + 𝐴𝐹𝐹&,(,)/0𝑅𝐸𝐶&,(,)/0𝛽9E2×155 + 𝑅𝑆&,(,)/0𝛽9: + 𝒁&,(,)/0𝜷= + 𝜖&,(,),         (3) 
 
                                                
22 Unlike platform recommendation lists, Morningstar star and analyst ratings can potentially reach investors in 
multiple platforms as well as investors who access mutual funds through other means. See the cited papers by 
Bergstresser and Poterba (2002), Del Guercio and Tkac (2008), and Ivković and Weisbenner (2009) and the paper by 
Armstrong, Genc, and Verbeek (2016) for an analysis of Morningstar star and analyst ratings impact on aggregate 
flows respectively. 
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and, 
 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤&,(,) = 𝑅𝐸𝐶&,(,)/0𝛽9E2 + 𝑅𝑆&,(,)/0𝑅𝐸𝐶&,(,)/0𝛽9E2×9: + 𝑅𝑆&,(,)/0𝛽9: + 𝒁&,(,)/0𝜷= + 𝜖&,(,).                     (4) 
 
Explanatory variables in equations (3) and (4) are as defined before, except that we only include 
lagged recommendation levels. Notice that including a full set of fund indicator variables renders 
the inclusion of the affiliated indicator variable unnecessary, since affiliation is a mostly time 
invariant characteristic in our sample.23 
We report the results of estimating these regressions in Table VIII. The coefficients on the 
interaction effect between Recommendation List and Affiliated is negative and significant in the 
GBP flow regression, suggesting that investors are more skeptical about recommendations of 
affiliated funds. In fact, the coefficient on the interaction almost equals in absolute value the 
value of the coefficient on Recommendation List, suggesting that affiliated recommendation have 
a much reduced impact on flows. The coefficients on the interaction effect between 
Recommendation List and Platform Revenue from Fund, on the other hand, are not statistically 
different from zero in either the GBP or percentage flow regressions. This suggests that investors, 
who are not privy to revenue share agreements, do not offset recommendations lists’ favoritism 
towards these funds. 
Our results show that, on average, recommendations have a substantial impact on net 
asset flows to mutual funds. However, investors heavily discount affiliated mutual fund 
recommendations, to the point where it almost makes no difference for flows, but they do not 
adjust for favoritism towards funds with high revenue share agreements with the platforms that 
recommend them. 
                                                
23 Only a handful of funds went from being affiliated to non-affiliated, or vice versa, during our sample period. Since 
the within estimator is well known to be imprecise for regressors that vary little over time we opted to exclude the 
Affiliated dummy variable from the model. Including it, however, has no discernible impact on any of the coefficient 
estimates reported in Table VIII, or their standard errors. 
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4. Do recommendations add value for investors? 
We measure value to investors of fund recommendations by comparing their performance, 
relative to the benchmarks chosen by Morningstar for those funds, with the performance of other 
funds in the same Morningstar category which are also available via the platforms but are not 
recommended.  
To generate aggregate measures of performance we create equal-weighted portfolio 
returns in excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks of recommended and non-recommended 
funds available in each month. We do this platform by platform, and then average results across 
platforms, with each platform receiving the same weight. As a result, funds may be weighted 
more heavily if they are recommended by multiple platforms, or if they appear, but are not 
recommended, in more platforms. Funds which are not available via any of the platforms do not 
enter into our calculations. This is because we evaluate recommendation lists, and lists can only 
recommend funds that are part of the platforms where they appear. 
Separately, we match each recommended fund to all non-recommended funds which are 
classified in the same (level 2) Morningstar category and also available in the platform. For each 
recommended fund we compute the equal-weighted average return of all non-recommended 
funds in both the same category and platform. We then create equal-weighted portfolio returns of 
the recommended funds and of the matching portfolio of non-recommended funds in excess of 
Morningstar chosen benchmarks (the benchmark is the same for recommended funds and the 
matching portfolio).  
In our calculations we use platform-specific net returns, which take into account charges 
and rebates applied by platforms assuming a notional investment of GBP 50,000 per account. 
Fund initial charges (front end loads), if any, are prorated assuming a five-year holding period.  
The results in Table IX indicate that, over our 10-year sample period, the portfolio of all 
funds on the platforms’ internally produced recommendation lists delivered average net returns in 
excess of Morningstar benchmarks of 0.08% per year. These returns are, on average, a 
statistically significant 0.94% per annum higher than the excess returns obtained by other funds 
available to investors in these platforms but not listed in recommendation lists. This comparison 
does not control for the types of funds that are recommended by platforms, and so may reflect, to 
some extent, the performance of the chosen asset class in a platform relative to benchmarks, 
rather than the performance of the recommended manager relative to their peers. To address this, 
we compare the returns of recommended funds to a matched sample of non-recommended funds 
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classified in the same Morningstar category (thus effectively comparing recommended and not 
recommended funds category by category in each platform) obtaining relatively similar results. 
Recommended funds outperform non-recommended funds by a statistically significant 0.60% per 
year.24 
As a robustness check, and following Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Morse (2016), in the last 
two columns of Table IX we repeat these calculations but dropping asset allocation and 
alternative investments funds because these funds represent heterogeneous investment strategies 
that make benchmarking challenging. The results for equity and fixed income funds only are 
similar to those reported before. Recommended funds outperform non-recommended funds in 
these two categories by 0.52% to 0.68% per year, depending on the benchmarking assumptions 
(Morningstar benchmarks or funds in the same categories available in the platform, respectively). 
The results discussed above, and shown in the first part of Table IX, are obtained 
assuming that funds are held only for the period during which they are listed in these 
recommendations lists. However, investors may be inattentive or disinclined to rebalance their 
portfolios with the frequency that such a strategy assumes. Accordingly, the second part of Table 
IX shows results for portfolios of funds built on the assumption that investors hold them for five 
years starting each listing month (or until the end of our sample period).25 Under the assumption 
of a five-year holding period, recommended funds still outperform non-recommended ones by 
between 0.43% to 0.83% per year, depending on the choice of benchmark (Morningstar chosen 
benchmark or average performance of non-recommended funds in the same Morningstar 
category), and regardless of whether asset allocation and alternative investment funds are 
included in the calculations or not. 
Analysis in Section 3A provides evidence that platform recommendation lists favor 
affiliated funds and funds with high revenue share to an extent that is difficult to justify by the 
qualities of those funds. In Table X we investigate the relationship between these two variables 
                                                
24  In the comparison between recommended funds and not recommended funds in the same platform and 
Morningstar category we drop funds for which there is no match in the corresponding category across these two 
dimensions. 
25 Estimates of average holding periods for mutual fund retail investors in the U.K. vary between 4 and 6 years for 
the period under study. See Investment Association (2016).  
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on the one hand and the performance of recommended funds on the other. In this table, sample 
periods are tailored to the portfolios studied. In particular, they exclude periods where no 
affiliated funds were recommended, when studying affiliation, and the post-RDR period (when 
platforms were no longer allowed to retain payments from asset managers), when studying 
revenue share. These sample period restrictions affect the length of our time series of 
recommendations for the analysis in which the holding period of a fund is for as long as it is 
listed, but not for the analysis based on five-year holding period portfolios.26 
The first part of Table X shows that recommended funds that are not affiliated 
significantly outperform non-recommended funds. The portfolio of non-affiliated recommended 
funds delivers net returns in excess of Morningstar category benchmarks that are, on average, 
1.04% per annum higher than the excess returns obtained by non-recommended funds available 
to investors via these platforms. While recommended funds exhibit similar performance, the 
difference is not statistically significant. When we compare the returns of recommended funds to 
a matched sample of non-recommended funds which are classified in the same Morningstar 
category, non-affiliated recommended funds outperform non-recommended ones by a statistically 
significant 0.74% per year. This contrasts with recommendations of affiliated funds, which 
perform similarly to the other funds that platforms could have recommended in the same 
categories but chose not to.  
When we consider portfolios of funds built assuming investors hold them for five years 
starting each listing month, we continue to find that recommended non-affiliated funds 
significantly outperform non-recommended funds by between 0.49% and 0.82% per year, 
depending on the choice of benchmark (Morningstar chosen benchmark or average performance 
of non-recommended funds in the same Morningstar category). However, recommended 
affiliated funds perform in line with non-recommended ones (differences in performance vary 
between -0.13% per year to 0.27% per year, and are in all cases not statistically significant). 
It is worth noting that when we compare affiliated funds to non-affiliated funds more 
generally, that is, by platform and category but regardless of whether they are recommended or 
                                                
26 For the five-year holding period portfolios, even though we still restrict recommendations to come from periods 
where affiliated funds have been recommended or the pre-RDR period, the fact that we track these recommendations 
during five years guarantees that the time series of portfolio returns extends for the full 10-year sample period. 
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not, we do not find differences in performance between these two groups. The average excess 
return over Morningstar chosen benchmarks, at -0.38% per year for affiliated funds and -0.35% 
per year for non-affiliated funds, is virtually undistinguishable. 
The second part of Table X shows the performance of recommended funds in the top and 
bottom half of revenue generated for the platform which makes the recommendation. The results 
in this table point to low revenue-generating recommended funds significantly outperforming 
non-recommended funds, but also to high revenue-generating recommended funds outperforming 
non-recommended funds (at least when five-year holding periods are considered).  In untabulated 
results we also find no evidence of a (linear) relation between revenue generated for the platform 
and recommendation performance. In a regression of excess return over benchmarks on 
recommendations and the interaction between recommendations and revenue generated for the 
platform, using standard errors robust to general forms of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and 
cross correlation, the coefficient associated to this interaction is statistically undistinguishable 
from zero. 
Overall, our results provide strong evidence that, on average, funds recommended by 
platforms outperform non-recommended funds. This is, however, not true when we confine the 
recommended funds to those which are affiliated with the platform, as these seem to do no better 
than other available funds in their same category. At the same time, the distortions brought about 
by the revenue sharing incentive seem to have little effect on investors who follow them. These 
results also help dispel the notion that private information, rather than favoritism, is behind some 
platforms’ recommendations of their own funds. If they recommended affiliated funds because 
they knew something meaningful about those funds which others did not, we should expect it to 
be reflected in post-recommendation performance. 
5. Conclusions 
Investment platforms are important channels between mutual funds and their investors. We study 
investment platforms in the U.K., which has one of the largest mutual fund industries in the 
world and where platforms intermediate over half of mutual fund flows. Among the wide range 
of funds that platforms make available, they select some to recommend to investors, and these 
recommendations have a considerable impact on fund flows. In making these recommendations, 
platforms are subject to two potential conflicts of interest. First, platforms are affiliated with 
some of the funds they offer to investors, and second, platforms in the U.K. have been allowed, 
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until recently, to receive from mutual funds a share of the asset management fees which the funds 
obtain from investors. Using a unique data set sourced through the U.K. financial regulator, 
which includes precise details of investment platforms’ recommendations, fund flows through 
individual platforms, and the affiliation or revenue-sharing relationship that the platforms have 
with mutual funds, we examine the drivers, impact, and performance of investment platforms’ 
recommendations of mutual funds.   
We find that, on average, recommended funds exhibit significantly better past 
performance than the non-recommended funds which are available on the same platform, and that 
recommended funds are less costly to investors in fee terms. Our results also show that a 
significantly higher percentage of affiliated than non-affiliated funds is recommended, and that, 
per GBP invested, recommended funds share more of their revenues with the platforms than non-
recommended funds. Our results confirm that platform recommendations have a substantial 
impact on flows. However, when we confine ourselves to recommended funds which are 
affiliated with the platform, flows are less responsive, suggesting that investors may discount 
such own-brand best buys. On the other hand, flows to recommended funds do not seem to 
depend on the percentage of revenue shared by these funds with the platforms, suggesting that 
investors (who in the U.K. do not see the revenue-sharing arrangements) do not offset platforms’ 
favoritism towards such funds. Recommended funds perform significantly better (after 
recommendation) than non-recommended funds. These performance results do not hold when we 
confine the recommended funds to those which are affiliated with the platform, as these seem to 
do no better than other available funds in the same category. On the other hand, the level of 
revenue sharing does not seem to have much impact on investors who follow them. Whether 
recommended funds have high or low revenue-sharing, they significantly outperform non-
recommended funds (at least when measured using five-year holding periods). 
By disentangling intermediary actions from customer actions, we are able to explore 
whether investors see through and undo the biases of platform recommendations. We find that, 
with affiliated funds where the platforms’ potential conflict is visible, investors partly undo the 
bias, but with high revenue funds where the potential conflict is not disclosed, this is not the case. 
In the setting we explore, in which recommendations are offered in a standardized form to a large 
audience, our findings are consistent with the potentially beneficial effects of greater disclosure 
of otherwise hidden incentives.  
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Table I 
Platforms, Funds, and Recommendations - Descriptive Statistics by Year 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the sample of mutual funds and recommendation lists produced by and 
available through the platforms used in our study. It shows the number of GBP denominated equity, fixed income, 
asset allocation, and alternative investments retail mutual funds available in the UK, the average number and the 
percentage of available funds offered per platform, the assets under management of funds offered in the platforms as 
a percentage of the total assets under management of the funds available in the UK, and the average number and 
percentage of funds recommended in any of the recommendation lists which platforms make available to their clients. 
These statistics are presented for the full sample period as well as for each year during that period, and for the 
periods before and after RDR implementation. 
 
  
2006 2,620 1,167 44.6 78.3 134 11.5
2007 2,899 1,361 46.9 77.3 149 11.0
2008 3,129 1,545 49.4 74.7 150 9.7
2009 3,298 1,705 51.7 76.4 132 7.7
2010 3,460 1,547 44.7 73.8 103 6.7
2011 3,711 1,655 44.6 75.2 102 6.1
2012 3,848 1,679 43.6 74.5 96 5.7
2013 3,989 1,743 43.7 74.9 103 5.9
2014 4,191 1,830 43.7 72.7 82 4.5
2015 4,438 1,717 38.7 71.0 61 3.5
Mean 3,558 1,595 45.2 74.9 111 7.2
Pre-RDR 3,450 1,582 45.8 75.6 119 7.8
Post-RDR 4,323 1,773 41.0 71.6 70 3.9
% of Funds 
Recommended 
per Platform
Average 
Number of 
Funds 
Recommended 
per Platform
Average % of 
Available Funds 
Offered in each 
Platform by Assets 
under 
Management
Average % of 
Available Funds 
Offered in each 
Platform
Average Number 
of Funds per 
Platform
Total Number 
of Funds 
Available in UK 
Market
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Table II 
Characteristics of Mutual Funds Offered and Not Offered through the Platforms 
This table presents descriptive statistics for funds offered, and not offered, through the platforms of our sample. The 
variables include: fund age, fund size (in billions of GBP) as measured by total assets under management, the 
volatility of monthly fund returns, turnover, the total fees and hypothetical platform charges for the fund, the 
percentage of five star rated funds by Morningstar, the percentage of gold-rated and gold, silver, or bronze-rated 
funds by Morningstar and mean performance percentiles. Performance percentiles are calculated over the previous 
one and three years based on funds in the same Morningstar category and assuming average platform charges after 
RDR. The averages are reported for the full sample as well as for the period before and after the implementation of 
RDR by each platform. P-values for the differences are reported in square brackets and are based on standard errors 
clustered at the fund level. Significance levels for tests of the difference in means are denoted by *, **, and ***, 
which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
In 
Platform
Not in 
Platform
Diff.
In 
Platform
Not in 
Platform
Diff.
In 
Platform
Not in 
Platform
Diff.
Fund Age 12.15 6.48 5.67 11.75 6.60 5.15 13.32 6.21 7.11
   (in Years) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Fund Size 0.25 0.08 0.17 0.24 0.08 0.16 0.27 0.08 0.19
   (in ₤B) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Return Std. Dev. 3.36 2.97 0.39 3.64 3.23 0.41 2.56 2.37 0.19
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Turnover 113.38 205.91 -92.53 116.04 178.48 -62.44 104.97 281.96 -176.99
   (in %) [0.08]* [0.07]* [0.10]
Fees and Charges 1.58 1.53 0.05 1.63 1.56 0.07 1.41 1.43 -0.02
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [0.18]
Morningstar 5 Star 11.78 4.60 7.18 10.55 4.37 6.18 15.35 5.15 10.20
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Morningstar Gold 2.24 0.49 1.75 2.39 0.55 1.84 1.82 0.37 1.45
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Morningstar G., S., and B. 15.16 3.83 11.33 14.28 3.64 10.64 17.73 4.28 13.45
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Prior 1-Yr. Perf. 50.49 48.57 1.92 50.42 48.61 1.81 50.69 48.48 2.21
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Prior 3-Yr. Perf. 51.11 47.58 3.53 50.49 48.32 2.17 52.42 46.21 6.21
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Observations 386,604 479,037 287,953 333,980 98,651 145,057
All Pre-RDR Post-RDR
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Table III 
Mutual Funds Offered and Recommended by Asset Category 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the sample of mutual funds available through the platforms used in our 
study. It shows the average number of funds per platform, average number of Morningstar categories represented by 
those funds, the average number of funds recommended per platform, average assets under management per fund (in 
millions of GBP), and the average net fees and platform charges to investors (in % per year). Descriptive statistics 
are reported for the full sample of mutual funds and separately for each of the asset classes included in our study: 
equity, fixed income, asset allocation, and alternative investments. The numbers reported are averages per year. 
 
 
  
Average Number 
of Funds per 
Platform
Average Number 
of Morninstar 
Categories 
Represented
Average Number 
of Funds 
Recommended per 
Platform
Average Assets 
under 
Management per 
Fund (millions 
GBP)
Average Net Fees 
and Platform 
Charges to Investors 
(% per year)
All funds 1,595 103 111 238 1.56
Equity 1,015 69 82 242 1.59
Fixed income 215 25 15 327 1.17
Asset Allocation 310 8 11 187 1.74
Alternative Investments 55 1 3 99 1.73
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Table IV 
Characteristics of Recommended and Non-Recommended Mutual Funds 
This table presents descriptive statistics for funds recommended and not recommended in the recommendation lists 
produced by and available through the platforms of our sample. Affiliated is the percentage of funds affiliated with 
the platform in each category. Platform Revenue from the fund is the revenue obtained by the platform from each 
pound individuals invest in the fund through the platform (in %). The remaining variables are mutual fund-level 
variables: fund age, fund size (in billions of GBP) as measured by total assets under management, the volatility of 
monthly fund returns, turnover, the total net fees and platform charges for the fund, the percentage of five star rated 
funds by Morningstar, the percentage of gold-rated and gold, silver, or bronze-rated funds by Morningstar and mean 
performance percentiles. Performance percentiles are calculated using funds returns in excess of Morningstar chosen 
benchmarks over the previous one and three years. The averages are reported for the full sample as well as for the 
period before and after the implementation of RDR by each platform. P-values for the differences are reported in 
square brackets and are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. Significance levels for tests of the 
difference in means are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Rec. Not Rec. Diff. Rec. Not Rec. Diff. Rec. Not Rec. Diff.
Affiliated 3.79 1.98 1.81 2.56 1.65 0.91 9.16 2.73 6.43
   (in %) [0.03]** [0.20] [<0.00]***
Platform Revenue 0.59 0.54 0.05 0.64 0.60 0.04 0.40 0.40 -
   from Fund (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Fund Age 13.33 12.58 0.75 12.84 12.29 0.55 15.47 13.23 2.24
   (in Years) [0.26] [0.45] [<0.00]***
Fund Size 1.09 0.21 0.88 1.05 0.19 0.86 1.21 0.24 0.97
   (in ₤B) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Return Std. Dev. 3.81 3.44 0.37 4.05 3.83 0.22 2.78 2.55 0.23
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [0.06]* [0.09]*
Turnover 99.92 113.88 -13.96 103.01 117.01 -14.00 85.02 105.88 -20.86
   (in %) [0.04]** [0.05]* [0.01]**
Total Fees and Charges Ratio 1.46 1.56 -0.10 1.52 1.64 -0.12 1.15 1.36 -0.21
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Morningstar 5 Star 30.94 11.56 19.38 30.83 10.18 20.65 31.39 14.71 16.68
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Morningstar Gold 18.04 1.41 16.63 18.84 1.43 17.41 14.53 1.35 13.18
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Morningstar G., S., and B. 60.31 14.00 46.31 61.62 13.01 48.61 54.56 16.24 38.32
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Prior 1-Yr. Perf. 55.76 49.06 6.70 55.61 49.00 6.61 56.29 49.19 7.10
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Prior 3-Yr. Perf. 63.44 48.52 14.92 64.97 48.24 16.73 59.22 49.01 10.21
   (in %) [<0.00]*** [<0.00]*** [<0.00]***
Observations 20,461 309,714 16,642 214,882 3,819 94,832
All Pre-RDR Post-RDR
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Table V 
Logit Model of Mutual Fund Additions to and Deletions from Recommendation Lists 
The first part of this table reports coefficient estimates for the logit model Prob(ACTp,f,t = 1) = (AFFp,f,t−1βAFF + 
RSp,f,t−1βRS + Zp,f,t−1βZ), where ACTp,f,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if mutual fund f is added to or 
deleted from (depending on the specification) the recommendation list in platform p during month t and 0 otherwise, 
AFFp,f,t−1 is an indicator for whether the fund f is affiliated with platform p at the end of month t−1, and RSp,f,t−1 is the 
revenue obtained by the platform p from each pound individuals invest in fund f through the platform at time t−1. 
The other lagged control variables in vector Z include the fund age, the natural logarithm of the fund’s size, the 
volatility of monthly fund returns, fund turnover, the total net fees and platform charges ratio for the fund, indicator 
variables for Morningstar five star-rated funds, Morningstar Analysts’ gold-rated funds, and Morningstar Analysts’ 
gold-, silver-, or bronze-rated funds, performance percentiles and indicator variables for calendar years and fund 
styles (not reported). Performance percentiles are calculated using funds returns in excess of Morningstar chosen 
benchmarks over the previous one and three years. Different regressions are estimated for Additions and Deletions 
and for the full sample as well as for the period before and after the implementation of RDR by each platform. z-
scores based on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level are included in parenthesis. The second part of the 
table displays model-implied average marginal effects for the two variables of interest: Affiliation and Platform 
Revenue from the Fund. Significance levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
All Pre-RDR Post-RDR All Pre-RDR Post-RDR
Affiliated 1.15 0.73 2.96 -0.59 0.15 -2.47
(2.90)*** (1.39) (4.09)*** (-1.24) (0.30) (-2.20)**
Platform Revenue from Fund 1.93 2.34 0.20 -0.43
(4.51)*** (5.85)*** (0.31) (-0.58)
Fund Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.00 0.00 -0.02
(-1.11) (-0.64) (-2.29)** (-0.18) (0.11) (-1.16)
Log (Fund Size) 0.30 0.28 0.35 0.11 0.24 -0.22
(4.43)*** (3.92)*** (1.82)* (1.03) (1.59) (-1.32)
Return Std. Dev. 15.95 17.81 -43.12 4.21 4.35 -9.27
 (1.87)* (2.03)** (-0.92) (0.75) (0.58) (-0.75)
Turnover -0.14 -0.21 0.29 0.07 0.24 -0.46
(-1.64) (-1.97)** (1.68)* (0.67) (2.15)** (-1.72)*
Total Fees and Charges Ratio -1.01 -1.39 0.26 -0.04 0.16 0.14
(-2.49)** (-3.11)*** (0.18) (-0.10) (0.29) (0.28)
Morningstar 5 Star 1.27 1.29 1.10 -0.11 0.07 -0.31
(5.08)*** (4.91)*** (1.44) (-0.53) (0.25) (-0.76)
Morningstar Gold -0.19 -0.28 0.71 -0.37 -0.20 -0.63
(-0.45) (-0.61) (0.60) (-1.12) (-0.53) (-0.94)
Morningstar G., S., and B. 0.41 0.43 0.91 -0.54 -0.78 -0.11
(1.83)* (1.84)* (1.02) (-2.38)** (-2.63)*** (-0.27)
Prior 1-Yr. Perf. -0.55 -0.35 -2.56 -0.65 -0.27 -2.14
(-1.31) (-0.78) (-2.66)*** (-2.20)** (-0.77) (-3.41)***
Prior 3-Yr. Perf. 0.33 0.20 1.11 -0.93 -1.70 1.05
(0.66) (0.36) (0.84) (-2.67)*** (-3.91)*** (1.52)
Affiliated 0.0017 0.0012 0.0027 -0.0085 0.0024 -0.0290
Platform Revenue from Fund 0.0016 0.0028 - 0.0036 -0.0065 -
Pseudo-R² 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.13
Observations 115,742 75,678 40,073 8,853 6,500 2,354
Additions Deletions
Average Marginal Effects
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Table VI 
Logit Model of Mutual Fund Additions to and Deletions from Morningstar's Gold, Silver, 
or Bronze Lists 
The first part of this table reports coefficient estimates for the logit model Prob(ACTp,f,t = 1) = (AFFp,f,t−1βAF + 
RSp,f,t−1βRS + Zp,f,t−1βZ), where ACTp,f,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if mutual fund f offered in 
platform p is, respectively, added to or deleted from Morningstar's gold, silver, or bronze lists during month t and 0 
otherwise, AFFp,f,t−1 is an indicator for whether the fund f is affiliated with platform p at the end of month t−1, and 
RSp,f,t−1 is the revenue obtained by the platform p from each pound individuals invest in fund f through the platform 
at time t−1. The other lagged control variables in vector Z include the fund age, the natural logarithm of the fund’s 
size, the volatility of monthly fund returns, fund turnover, the total net fees and platform charges ratio for the fund, 
indicator variables for Morningstar five star-rated funds, performance percentiles and indicator variables for calendar 
years, and fund styles (not reported). Performance percentiles are calculated using funds returns in excess of 
Morningstar chosen benchmarks over the previous one and three years. Different regressions are estimated for 
Additions and Deletions and for the full sample as well as for the period before and after the implementation of RDR 
by each platform. z-scores based on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level are included in parentheses. 
Significance levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
All Pre-RDR Post-RDR All Pre-RDR Post-RDR
Affiliated 0.46 0.48 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.33
(1.68)* (1.49) (0.10) (0.51) (0.06) (0.81)
Platform Revenue from Fund 0.38 0.30 0.13 0.23
(1.48) (1.15) (0.46) (0.70)
Fund Age -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(-1.60) (-1.84)* (0.12) (1.32) (1.44) (0.34)
Log (Fund Size) 0.51 0.47 0.87 -0.15 -0.18 -0.09
(8.22)*** (7.11)*** (4.35)*** (-3.49)*** (-3.64)*** (-1.20)
Return Std. Dev. 10.10 8.65 11.37 13.42 12.27 14.56
 (1.81)* (1.53) (0.54) (2.40)** (2.00)** (1.37)
Turnover -0.11 -0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15
(-1.43) (-1.86)* (1.10) (2.36)** (1.87)* (1.40)
Total Fees and Charges Ratio 0.51 0.66 -0.40 -0.30 -0.30 -0.34
(2.14)** (2.74)*** (-0.51) (-1.44) (-1.09) (-0.88)
Morningstar 5 Star 0.68 0.56 1.05 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(3.56)*** (2.58)*** (2.15)** (0.04) (0.10) (-0.03)
Prior 1-Yr. Perf. 0.51 0.43 1.44 -0.53 -0.67 -0.09
(1.63) (1.32) (1.39) (-1.94)* (-2.19)** (-0.14)
Prior 3-Yr. Perf. 1.07 0.95 1.96 -0.63 -0.72 -0.66
(3.10)*** (2.63)*** (1.60) (-2.13)** (-2.01)** (-1.12)
Pseudo-R² 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.02
Observations 95,323 63,375 31,958 30,502 19,412 11,090
Additions to Morningstart Gold, Silver, 
or Bronze Lists
Deletions from Morningstar Gold, Silver, 
or Bronze Lists
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Table VII  
Regressions of Asset Flows on Past Mutual Fund Recommendations 
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions of yearly platform specific GBP and 
percentage asset flows on past fund recommendations and recommendation changes (additions and deletions from 
recommendation lists). BGP flows are expressed in millions of GB pounds. Percentage flows are computed as the 
ratio of platform specific pound flows to total assets under management at the end of the previous year. Each column 
represents a separate regression. All regressions include a set of lagged control variables: the fund age, the fund size 
(the natural logarithm of the fund’s size in the relative flow regressions), the volatility of monthly fund returns, fund 
turnover, the total expense ratio for the fund, indicator variables for Morningstar five star-rated funds, Morningstar 
Analysts’ gold-rated funds, and Morningstar Analysts’ gold-, silver-, or bronze-rated funds, performance percentiles 
and indicator variables for calendar years, platforms, and individual funds (not reported). Performance percentiles are 
calculated over the previous one and three years based on funds in the same Morningstar category. t-statistics based 
on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level are included in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *, 
**, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Recommendation List 5.91 5.84 6.24 0.01 0.01 0.01
(4.67)*** (3.91)*** (3.24)*** (3.82)*** (2.90)*** (2.00)**
Added to the Rec. List -2.96 -2.16 0.00 0.01
(-1.52) (-0.75) (0.32) (0.98)
Added to the Rec. List (t-2) -1.56 0.00
(-0.68) (0.78)
Added to the Rec. List (t-3) -1.66 0.00
(-1.08) (0.12)
Removed from the Rec. List -4.30 -4.41 -0.01 -0.01
(-3.67)*** (-3.62)*** (-3.19)*** (-3.34)***
Removed from the Rec. List (t-2) -2.86 -0.01
(-2.09)** (-2.28)**
Removed from the Rec. List (t-3) -1.65 0.00
(-2.44)** (0.23)
Fund Age 0.20 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.62)*** (4.16)*** (4.02)*** (3.31)*** (2.45)** (3.25)***
Fund Size 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-3.20)*** (-3.17)*** (-3.12)*** (-4.62)*** (-4.56)*** (-4.55)***
Return Std. Dev. -5.05 -3.18 -2.54 0.03 0.04 0.03
 (-0.46) (-0.29) (-0.19) (0.55) (0.63) (0.49)
Turnover -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-1.48) (-1.44) (-1.39) (-1.18) (-1.16) (-1.21)
Total Expense Ratio -0.17 -0.22 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.57) (-0.78) (-0.03) (1.10) (1.01) (0.96)
Morningstar 5 Star 1.27 1.32 1.54 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.90)*** (3.00)*** (2.73)*** (1.74)* (1.67)* (1.47)
Morningstar Gold -6.21 -6.07 -6.93 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.33) (-1.32) (-1.30) (-1.21) (-1.21) (-1.20)
Morningstar G., S., and B. 0.56 0.55 0.53 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(1.20) (1.19) (0.96) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.22)
Prior 1-Yr. Perf. 1.02 1.04 1.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3.09)*** (3.15)*** (2.95)*** (2.62)*** (2.66)*** (2.64)***
Prior 3-Yr. Perf. 0.45 0.37 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.88) (0.75) (0.14) (1.98)** (1.88)* (1.73)*
Year, Platform, and Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.86 0.86 0.87
Observations 9,455 9,455 8,124 8,421 8,421 7,229
GBP Flows Percentage Flows
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Table VIII  
Regressions of Asset Flows on Past Mutual Fund Recommendations - Interaction Effects  
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions of yearly platform specific GBP and 
percentage asset flows on past fund recommendations and interactions of this variable with other variables of interest. 
GBP flows are expressed in millions of GB pounds. Percentage flows are computed as the ratio of platform specific 
pound flows to total assets under management at the end of the previous year. Each column represents a separate 
regression. Affiliated is an indicator variable that has the value of one if the fund is affiliated with the platform and 
zero otherwise. Platform Revenue from the fund is the revenue obtained by the platform from each pound individuals 
invest in the fund through the platform (in %). All regressions include a set of lagged control variables: the fund age, 
the fund size (the natural logarithm of the fund’s size in the relative flow regressions), the volatility of monthly fund 
returns, fund turnover, the total expense ratio for the fund, indicator variables for Morningstar five star-rated funds, 
Morningstar Analysts’ gold-rated funds, and Morningstar Analysts’ gold-, silver-, or bronze-rated funds, 
performance percentiles and indicator variables for calendar years, platforms, and individual funds (not reported). 
Performance percentiles are calculated over the previous one and three years based on funds in the same Morningstar 
category. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level are included in parentheses. 
Significance levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recommendation List 6.33 8.69 0.01 0.01
(4.70)*** (3.30)*** (3.74)*** (1.66)*
Rec. List × Affiliated -5.18 -0.00
(-3.65)*** (-1.14)
Rec. List × Platform Revenue from Fund -4.31 0.00
(-1.37) (0.44)
Platform Revenue from Fund -0.35 -0.20 -0.00 -0.00
(-1.11) (-0.72) (-0.56) (-0.70)
Fund Age 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.00
(4.79)*** (4.43)*** (4.09)*** (4.08)***
Fund Size 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(-3.20)*** (-3.21)*** (-4.61)*** (-4.62)***
Return Std. Dev. -5.02 -5.25 0.03 0.03
 (-0.45) (-0.47) (0.57) (0.59)
Turnover -0.20 -0.21 -0.00 -0.00
(-1.55) (-1.57) (-1.20) (-1.19)
Total Expense Ratio 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.23) (1.07) (0.99)
Morningstar 5 Star 1.28 1.31 0.00 0.00
(2.89)*** (2.89)*** (1.74)* (1.74)*
Morningstar Gold -6.27 -6.32 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.33) (-1.32) (-1.21) (-1.21)
Morningstar G., S., and B. 0.59 0.57 -0.00 -0.00
(1.25) (1.20) (-1.18) (-1.18)
Prior 1-Yr. Perf. 1.02 1.01 0.00 0.00
(3.11)*** (3.06)*** (2.65)*** (2.64)***
Prior 3-Yr. Perf. 0.44 0.46 0.00 0.00
(0.88) (0.90) (1.97)** (1.97)**
Year, Platform, and Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.26 0.26 0.86 0.86
Observations 9,391 9,391 8,378 8,378
GBP Flows Percentage Flows
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Table IX  
Performance of Recommended and Non-Recommended Mutual Funds 
This table shows the performance of mutual funds that are listed as recommended in the internally produced lists 
available on the platforms in our study. The table also shows the performance of mutual funds not recommended in 
these lists that are also available on these platforms, and the difference in performance between recommended and 
non-recommended mutual funds. Performance is measured using returns in excess of benchmarks selected by 
Morningstar. The first column shows results for the full sample of recommended and non-recommended mutual 
funds. The second column shows results for a matched sample of recommended and non-recommended mutual funds 
classified in the same (level 2) Morningstar category, thus effectively comparing recommended and non-
recommended funds category by category. The last two columns repeat these calculations for equity and fixed 
income mutual funds only. The first part of the table shows the results assuming mutual funds are held only for the 
period they are listed (or not) in these recommendation lists whereas the second part of the table shows the same 
statistics for portfolios of mutual funds built assuming investors hold them for five years starting each listing month 
(or until the end of our sample period). Excess returns are expressed in % per year. Statistics are computed on 
monthly returns and annualized by multiplying monthly returns by twelve. The sample period is January 2006 to 
December 2015. t-statistics based on standard errors, robust to conditional heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of 
up to two lags as in Newey and West (1987), are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
Avg. Excess Ret. over 
Benchmark
Avg. Excess Ret. over 
Benchmark - Matched 
Sample
Avg. Excess Ret. over 
Benchmark - Equity 
and Fixed Income 
Mutual Funds Only
Avg. Excess Ret. over 
Benchmark - Matched 
Sample, Equity and 
Fixed Income Mutual 
Funds Only
0.08% 0.06% 0.20% 0.18%
(0.11) (0.08) (0.26) (0.23)
-0.86% -0.54% -0.48% -0.34%
(-1.35) (-0.81) (-0.84) (-0.52)
0.94% 0.60% 0.68% 0.52%
(3.75)*** (2.88)*** (2.31)** (2.36)**
-0.01% -0.03% 0.11% 0.10%
(-0.02) (-0.03) (0.16) (0.14)
-0.84% -0.51% -0.49% -0.33%
(-1.32) (-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.50)
0.83% 0.48% 0.60% 0.43%
(4.32)*** (3.21)*** (2.71)*** (2.79)***
Recommended minus 
Non-Recommended 
Recommended Mutual 
Funds
Recommended Mutual 
Funds
Non-Recommended 
Mutual Funds
Holding 
Period for as 
long as 
Listed
Five-year 
Holding 
Period
Non-Recommended 
Mutual Funds
Recommended minus 
Non-Recommended 
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Table X  
Recommendation Performance by Affiliation and Revenue Share 
This table shows the performance of recommended mutual funds that are affiliated with the platforms where 
recommendations are listed, and the performance of recommended funds not affiliated with the platforms. Separately 
it shows the performance of recommended mutual funds in the top and bottom half of revenue generated for the 
platform where the recommendation are listed. Performance is measured using returns in excess of benchmarks 
selected by Morningstar. The first column shows results for the full sample of recommended and non-recommended 
mutual funds assuming mutual funds are held only for the period they are listed (or not). The second column shows 
results for a matched sample of recommended and non-recommended mutual funds classified in the same (level 2) 
Morningstar category, thus effectively comparing recommended and non-recommended funds category by category 
in each platform. The third and fourth columns show the same statistics for portfolios of mutual funds built assuming 
investors hold recommended and non-recommended funds for five years starting at each listing month (or until the 
end of our sample period). Excess returns are expressed in % per year. Statistics are computed on monthly returns 
and annualized by multiplying monthly returns by twelve. The sample period is tailored to the issue under study 
(excludes the post-RDR period for the revenue shared portfolios and periods with no affiliated funds in 
recommendation lists for the affiliation based portfolios). t-statistics based on standard errors, robust to conditional 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of up to two lags as in Newey and West (1987), are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Avg. Excess Ret. 
over Benchmark
Avg. Excess Ret. 
over Benchmark - 
Matched Sample
Avg. Excess Ret. 
over Benchmark
Avg. Excess Ret. 
over Benchmark - 
Matched Sample
0.57% 0.57% -0.58% -0.58%
(0.60) (0.60) (-0.51) (-0.51)
0.56% 0.53% -0.02% -0.03%
(0.78) (0.74) (-0.03) (-0.05)
1.05% -0.03% 0.27% -0.13%
(1.53) (-0.07) (0.36) (-0.22)
1.04% 0.74% 0.82% 0.49%
(4.17)*** (3.98)*** (4.13)*** (3.12)***
0.02% -0.01% 0.03% -0.01%
(0.02) (-0.01) (0.04) (-0.02)
0.14% 0.13% -0.49% -0.48%
(0.19) (0.18) (-0.82) (-0.79)
0.83% 0.31% 0.98% 0.45%
(1.66) (0.80) (2.84)*** (2.10)**
0.95% 0.75% 0.45% 0.34%
(3.37)*** (3.31)*** (2.04)** (2.08)**
Recommended Mutual Funds 
(Affiliated)
Recommended Mutual Funds 
(Not Affiliated)
Recommended Affiliated 
minus Non-Recommended
Recommended Not Affiliated 
minus Non-Recommended
Platform 
Revenue 
from the 
Fund
Recommended Mutual Funds 
(High Revenue)
Recommended Mutual Funds 
(Low Revenue)
Recommended High Revenue 
minus Non-Recommended
Recommended Low Revenue 
minus Non-Recommended
Holding Period for as long as Listed Five-year Holding Period
Affiliation
